

Risk & Near-Misses: The Ghosts of Future Disasters
When we narrowly avoid catastrophe, our brains play a dangerous trick: we feel relief, even vindication, instead of alarm. That close call becomes evidence that our risk calculations were correct, our systems are robust, our luck will hold.
This is the near-miss bias, and it has contributed to disasters from the Columbia Shuttle explosion to the 2008 financial crisis to preventable mass shootings.
For two decades, I've studied how individuals, organizations, and societies mislearn from near-misses, normalizing danger rather than correcting course. This research, funded by NASA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Science Foundation, reveals both why near-misses deceive us and how organizations can transform these ghosts of future disasters into actionable warnings.

The Problem: Why Near-Misses Deceive
Near-misses are ambiguous signals. They contain two competing narratives:
The Successful Narrative: "We got away with it. Our margins were adequate. The system worked."
The Warning Narrative: "We got lucky. Our margins were inadequate. The system nearly failed."
Most individuals and organizations instinctively adopt the successful narrative because:
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It feels better (positive emotion beats negative)
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It confirms existing practices (no costly changes needed)
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It provides false precision ("We were 90% safe" vs. "We don't know how close we came")
But repeated near-misses don't mean you're getting better at avoiding disaster. They mean you're getting closer to experiencing one.

Research Evidence from NASA missions to Disaster Response to Terrorism
Near misses affect us at three levels:
Individual Level (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008, Management Science; Tinsley et al. 2011 Management Science) Near-misses inflate confidence rather than prompt caution. In experiments based on real world organizational and natural disasters both novices and field experts processed near-misses as signals of relief rather than warnings. Those who experienced near-misses showed:
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Between 15% - 30% increase in risky behavior in subsequent decisions
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Elevated confidence despite objectively increased danger
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Systematic underestimation of probability of future negative events
Public Level (Dillon, Tinsley, & Burns, 2014, Risk Analysis; Dillon & Tinsley, 2015, Environmental systems decisions) Repeated near-misses in domains as varied as natural disasters, infrastructure threats, and terrorism reduced protective behavior by 10-15% in the general population rather than increasing it, unless the events were explicitly framed as signals of vulnerability. Thus, public communication around hazards from coastal hurricanes, to terrorist threats, to technological failures should highlight the thin line between survival and catastrophe.
Organizational Level (Tinsley et al., 2011, Harvard Business Review; Dillon, Tinsley, Madsen, & Rogers, 2016, Journal of Management; Madsen, Dillon-Merrill, & Tinsley, 2016, Risk Analysis ) Organizations often fail to learn from near-miss events, not because of lack of information, but due to misinterpretation of outcomes. Across experimental and real-world settings in organizations as varied as NASA, BP, and JetBlue as well as data from the Airline industry the evidence consistently shows how near-misses are repeatedly dismissed, reinforcing risky behavior and embedding systemic vulnerability.
Additional Evidence from Other Domains
Financial Crisis (2008)
Multiple "mini-crises" and market corrections preceded 2008, each time followed by recovery that reinforced belief in system resilience and self-correction.
My Public Writing: Forbes: "Why Risk-Taking Got (and Gets) Out of Hand"
Mass Shootings
Warning signs and "near-miss" threats that don't materialize often lead schools and organizations to dismiss future warnings rather than strengthen prevention.
My Public Writing: The Hill: "Origins of a Mass-Shooting Disaster"
COVID-19 Risk Creep
As people experienced COVID exposures without getting sick, many systematically increased risky behavior—the near-miss effect operating at population scale.
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My Public Writing: Harvard Business Review: How risky behavior spreads.

The Solution: Making Near-Misses Visible
To transform near-misses into moments of insight rather than complacency, organizations and their leaders must align their framing, detection systems, and accountability structures. As research across NASA, telecom, oil, aviation, and tech shows, the absence of a bad outcome doesn’t mean absence of risk—only the temporary absence of consequences.
1. Framing & Messaging: Shape Interpretation to Highlight Risk
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How near-misses are communicated determines whether they amplify or attenuate risk-taking.
Near-misses are often interpreted as successes because people tend to judge decisions by results rather than processes. This can be countered by reframing.
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Emphasize “how close to failure” the outcome was instead of celebrating success.
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Communicate near-misses as “deviations from expected norms”, not lucky escapes.
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Both lab and field studies show that when people are told they narrowly avoided harm, they become more risk-sensitive.
2. Recognition Systems: Categorize Near-Misses as Unique Signals
Organizations must first see near-misses as a distinct class: they are neither failures (which prompt reaction) nor successes (which breed complacency).
Near-misses are often invisible in existing systems because they don't trigger the flags associated with failure. Institutionalize their detection by:
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Developing procedures to routinely surface “deviations from normal,” even if outcomes were successful.
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Creating a third category to label outcomes as “near-miss” distinct from “pass” or “fail”.
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Using formal post-success reviews. The military’s “after action reviews” and NASA’s "pause-and-learn" sessions demonstrate the value of reviewing successes as carefully as failures.
3. Accountability & Incentives: Reward Speaking Up, Publicly
Learning depends on who notices, who speaks up, and how they’re treated.
Employees may fear retaliation, embarrassment, or see no incentive to report near-misses. Create a climate of safety, so information doesn’t die at the front lines, by:
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Rewarding when risk is surfaced. Commend staff publicly for near misses, even if they were partially responsible.
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Recognizing that tight schedules and cost targets bias managers to discount risk signals.
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Making disclosure a job requirement: Both lab and field data show that when managers knew they'd have to explain near-miss decisions to superiors, their evaluations became more critical and realistic.
Final Takeaway:
Investing in structural “correctives” (e.g., safety climate, incentive design, communication norms) is not just risk mitigation; it’s smart strategy to creating learning organizations.



Key Publications
Foundational Work:
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Dillon, R.L. & Tinsley, C.H. (2008). How near-misses influence decision making under risk: A missed opportunity for learning. Management Science, 54(8), 1425-1440.
Risk Amplification & Attenuation:
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Tinsley, C.H., Dillon, R.L., & Cronin, M.A. (2012). How near-miss events amplify or attenuate risky decision making. Management Science, 58(9), 1596-1613.
Organizational Learning:
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Madsen, P.M., Dillon-Merrill, R., & Tinsley, C.H. (2016). Airline safety improvements through experience with near-misses: A cautionary tale. Risk Analysis, 36(5), 1054-1066.
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Field study of aviation industry
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Shows near-misses don't automatically improve safety
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Dillon-Merrill, R., Tinsley, C.H., Madsen, P.M., & Rogers, E.W. (2016). Organizational correctives for improving recognition of near-miss events. Journal of Management, 42(3), 671-697.
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Experiments using NASA field data
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Improved organizational recognition by up to 47%
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Applications:
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Dillon, R.L., Tinsley, C.H., & Burns, W. (2014). Near-misses and future disaster preparedness. Risk Analysis, 34(10), 1907-1922.
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Hurricane evacuation decisions
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Policy implications for disaster messaging
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Dillon, R.L., Tinsley, C.H., & Burns, W. (2014). Evolving risk perceptions about near-miss terrorist events. Decision Analysis Journal, 11(1), 27-42.
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Terrorism threat perception
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DHS applications​​​
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Practitioner Writing:
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Tinsley, C.H., Dillon, R.L., & Madsen, P.M. (2011). How to avoid catastrophe. Harvard Business Review, April, 90-96.
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Near-miss frameworks for managers
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Logg, J.M. & Tinsley, C.H. (2023). How risky behavior spreads. Harvard Business Review, February.
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Social transmission of risk normalization
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Tinsley, C.H. & Dillon, R.L. (2009). Why risk-taking got (and gets) out of hand. Forbes, June.
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Near-misses and the financial crisis
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Tinsley, C.H. (2018). Origins of a mass-shooting disaster. The Hill, November.
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Ignored warning signs as near-misses
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Emerging Questions:
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How does social media amplify or attenuate near-miss learning?
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Can AI systems be designed to recognize near-misses humans miss?
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What makes some organizations better at near-miss learning than others?